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ABSTRACT
A brief review of recent literature on corporate governance is provided,
which is then concluded with a proposed corporate governance
framework as a starting point for further development. We propose
that it is stakeholder concentration that determines the quality of
corporate governance. Next objective of this paper is the more ambitious
one of addressing the role of accounting and finance disciplines to serve
corporate governance. We test empirically if the use of some accounting
and finance tools would have alerted management, auditors and
regulators as well as investors to the impending collapse of failed firms
ahead of time. If performance deterioration is not verifiable by using
such acclaimed tools of these disciplines, then the advocacy of these
disciplines is untenable and their contribution is overstated. Careful
application of accounting-cum-finance tools, it appears, would have
pre-identified the financial weakening of troubled firms, well ahead of
time to catastrophic failures.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper outlines a model of governance that extends the rule-making and
institution building aspects of civil society to the narrower framework provided by
accounting-cum-finance discipline framework. The empirical results are obtained
using the tools of accounting and finance disciplines: these are specific models
namely the bankruptcy prediction model and the free cash flow model, as two
available tools along with the usual financial ratio analyses. The implications of
the findings from our research highlight the central theme that careful analyses of
readily available information in today’s tools-of-the-trade within the established
accounting and finance disciplines could have indicated impending potential failures
a year ahead of the failures.
Corporate governance as a serious and urgent research issue has become
established over the last ten years since 1997,1 especially after the public spectacle
of failures of once-esteemed public firms during the first four years of the new
century.2 Increasing number of codes of best practice have been developed by
leading international bodies such as the OECD, the Commonwealth and CalPERS
(refer Demirag et al., 2000, for a fuller list of publications), and the reforms put in
the stock exchanges, securities commissions, accounting professions have now
become global. The increasing integration of financial markets, the growth in
multinational corporations and regional economic developments all argue and
motivate market players to adopt good corporate governance practices in the face
of recent spate of large corporate collapses in Western countries such as the cases
of HIH Insurance in Australia, Parmalat in Europe, Enron and WorldCom in the
United States (U.S.) as well as non-Western economies.3 The issue of corporate
governance is even more important in transitional economies (see Roland, 2000).
Attention to corporate governance is largely motivated by public interest in the
economic health of corporations and society in general. Studies in Finance indicate
that firms adopting good governance practices appear to earn a premium over the
1 Concern about the quality of governance of corporations by professional management has been a
mainstay of oversight rules and laws in the US for almost 120 years, especially from the period of
anti-trust merger mania during 1885-95, and as attempts to rein in management excesses during the
Depression in the 1930s. Nevertheless, the broader scope of governance regulations emerged only in
the 1990s, and got spurred after the high-profile fraudulent behaviour of Arthur Anderson and Enron
in 2001. Outside of the US, concern for governance is a more recent phenomenon from about mid-
1990s.
2 Examples are: Australia (One-tel; Ansett); China (Citic groups); England (Maxwell Corp; BP);
France (BNP; Societe General); Italy (Parmalat); Germany (a construction giant); Japan (an investment
firm); Korea (Samsung); US (Arthur Anderson; Enron; Worldcom).
3 Even the courts of justices have become alerted to the dangers of corporate misbehaviour. In October,
2006, a U.S. court handed a 24-year jail term to the former chief executive of Enron for his role in
fostering corporate fraud in that firm, which went bankrupt as a result.
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returns to investors from those firms that do not adopt good governance code of
practices.
No sooner has the world learned fresh lessons about good governance rules to
prevent the repeat of failures of institutions to safeguard investors, new cases have
emerged that cast doubt that the lessons of previous years have been learned. A
number of new cases have emerged – Parmalat, Societe General, in Europe and an
investment house in Japan in 2006 that draw public attention to the international
nature of governance. While new laws and regulations as well as oversight
institutions have been established to improve governance, what about investor
protection? There is a vast store of information churned relating to the 143,000
public firms on the stock markets to study this phenomenon. Are these data any
use in governance prediction? This is the motivation of this study. This paper aims
to examine for evidence: Is it at all possible to assess tell-tale signs of impending
failures of public firms – indeed with similar data of private firms – using the tools
of accounting and finance?
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 contains a review of
what is governance as it is understood by different researchers. In Section 3, we
present a framework based on stakeholder concentration as driving governance.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
Slow Evolution of Systems
Tackling bad governance has been after the fact as humans improve things only
after a given process fails dramatically, a historical fact. Corporate governance
systems evolved over centuries reactively in response to corporate failures or
systemic crises: the South Sea Bubble and the Tulip Mania of 18th and 20th centuries
revolutionized business laws and practices in England. The securities laws in the
U.S. were changed due to the stock market crash of 1929. The Enron-Worldcom
flop did the same in 2001 in the U.S. The history of corporate governance has also
been punctuated by series of well-known company failures: collapse of the Bank
of Credit and Commerce International and Barings Bank, Enron, WorldCom, HIH,
OneTel, Parmalat (and the list goes on). These were consequences of incompetence,
fraud certainly and abuse of power as much as from lack of oversight rules, and
were met by new elements of an improved system of corporate governance.
Although corporate governance issues have been seen historically to be the
province of lawyers and finance professionals, economists have begun to make
important contributions in this area. Lawyers writing in this area tend to focus on
the fiduciary duties of the directors and the need to have independent directors,
who will represent the interests of minority shareholders without linking it to the
role of the capital markets, whereas economists see good corporate governance as
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a means of improving the efficiency of the capital markets, so that sustainable
economic growth can occur in this era of increasingly global capital markets
(The Economist, 7th April 2001, pp. 1-18).
Thus whilst there is general agreement that corporate governance plays a very
significant role in an individual company beyond the interests of shareholders,
how to implement good governance procedures remains elusive, and is very much
influenced by the disciplinary (silo) viewpoint of the implementer.
The economic view of corporate governance is that it has an impact on the
vitality and integrity of the market system: uniquely the market system is today
universally accepted even by Cuba, Iran and North Korea. Guillen (2000) states
corporate governance plays a key role by providing a framework for the division
of labour and financial results in the firm. A well-functioning corporate governance
system can contribute to economic efficiency and perhaps even social equity
whereas, on the other hand, a poorly conceived framework can wreak havoc in the
economy by misallocating resources or failing to check the opportunistic behaviour
by agents (the insiders in firms).
We now look at some important definitions in this approach are highlighted
in the following quotes:
“Corporate governance is a field in economics that investigates how
to secure/motivate efficient management of corporations by the use of
incentive mechanisms, such as contracts, organizational designs and
legislation. This is often limited to the question of improving financial
performance, for example, how the corporate owners can secure/
motivate that the corporate managers will deliver a competitive rate of
return”, (Mathiesen, 2002, P. 35).
“Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their
investment”, (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, p. 737).
The economist’s view of corporate governance is: managers are the custodians
of the assets – mostly funded by public funds coming directly in investments or
indirectly from bank loans - with prime responsibility to use those assets efficiently
to achieve a firm’s socially-approved objectives. Economists believe that creating
value for the shareholders is the essence of good corporate governance while not
neglecting the responsibility of the firms to its other constituets: employees;
suppliers; financiers; importantly the customers who buy the firm’s products. While
managers often go the slippery road of considering good governance as interference
with the management’s right to conduct the affairs of the firm, they often resent
the demands of the shareholders expectations. Research suggests that investors
value corporate governance in both developed and emerging economies but the
amount of premium the investors want to pay for the role of the board and accounting
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standards vary in respect to developed and emerging countries (Fitzroy and Hulbert,
2003) (see Appendix 1).
Despite the workings of the market mechanism and the premium investors
are willing to pay for good corporate governance, recent high profile cases of
governance failure led to corporate misconduct whereby the public, the employees
and pensioners have lost billions in investment and savings at the expense of gains
to insiders, much of it by fraud. These events have demonstrated that the current
corporate governance mechanisms have not kept up with the free-market
philosophies of the puritanical economists. Therefore, the development of robust
governance tools and incentive structures in the light of rapid changes in the markets
and financial innovation are needed to limit present inconsistencies because
confusion assumes prime importance, despite the attractions of agents’ incentive
compensations.
The legal viewpoint of corporate governance is that it refers to the procedures
and rules, explicit and implicit, as well as the set of disincentives that provide the
incentive framework for companies to attract financial and human capital, perform
efficiently and avoid corruption. These evolved over time, and are still evolving in
response to corporate failures and systemic crisis. Those subscribing to such an
approach are of the view that corporate governance is a modern expression on an
issue which companies have been facing for decades i.e., that of “accountability”.
Corporate governance is seen as how those entrusted with day-to-day management
of a company’s affairs are held accountable to shareholders and other stakeholders
by ensuring that the organisation has appropriate corporate structures to underpin
such accountability.
Some important definitions in this approach are highlighted in the following
quote:
“Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations
are directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure
specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different
participants in the corporation, such as, the board, managers,
shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and
procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it
also provides the structure through which the company objectives are
set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring
performance”, (OECD April 1999).4
The societal (social) viewpoint of corporate governance is that it is about
communications i.e., how the company presents itself to the wider world –
4 OECD’s definition is consistent with one presented by Cadbury, 1992; page 15.
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shareholders, potential investors, employees, regulations and other groups with a
legitimate interest in its affairs (www.pwcglobal.com/uk/eng/ins-sol/survey-rep/
surv). This view rests on the premise that, whilst corporate governance is principally
concerned about the relationship between shareholders, management and the board
in determining the direction and performance of the corporation (Monks and
Minow, 2001, p.1), its scope should be even broader, encompassing other issues
like the ethical standards, crisis management, reporting to stakeholders not only in
strict compliance with legal issues in a country, but also in terms of social
responsibility. Some important definitions in this approach are highlighted in the
following quotes:
“Corporate governance - which can be defined narrowly as the
relationship of a company to its shareholders or, more broadly, as its
relationship to society” (from an article in The Financial Times, 1997.
“Corporate governance is about promoting corporate fairness,
transparency and accountability” (Wolfensohn, 1999)
Some commentators take too narrow a view in defining corporate governance,
and say corporate governance is the fancy term for the way in which directors
and auditors handle their responsibilities towards shareholders. Others use the
expression as if it were synonymous with shareholder democracy (Maw et al.,
1994, page 1).
Core Aspects of the Discipline Based Models
 Despite the varied approaches of academic discipline based models, most
definitions of corporate governance refer to two things:
– the mechanisms by which corporations are directed and controlled; and
– the mechanisms by which those who direct and control a corporation are
supervised.5
This is a micro view of governance. This core view of corporate governance
indicates that it relates to how the various constituencies that define the business
enterprise serve, and are served by, the firm. Thus corporate governance is
concerned with the relationship between shareholders and other stakeholders, the
board of directors and management. It represents the explicit as well as implicit
5 Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP, Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes relevant to the
European Union and its Member States. ©Australian Securities & Investments Commission, July
2002 Page 5.
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relationships between the corporation and its employees, customers, creditors,
suppliers, and host communities (and the dynamics of the relationships among
these constituencies) fall within the boundary of an embracing definition of
corporate governance. Some principles of corporate governance are of universal
value, most importantly, transparency and disclosure principles. Thus corporate
governance is about balancing two objectives: promote business enterprise
(economic), and assure accountability of business to shareholders (legally) and to
society (socially) (www.gcgf.org/library/speeches/).6 Defining corporate
governance therefore calls into question not only the definition of the corporate
form, but also its purposes and its accountability to each of the relevant
constituencies.
An applied finance view of corporate governance is also emerging in which
corporate governance is viewed as a set of accounting and finance practices used
by management to steer the firm to increase the value creation of the firm after
meeting the demands of the stakeholders. This view is based on practice and
application.
Globalisation
Globalisation and the increasing volume of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flowing
into most developing countries have led to a convergence of what used to be
differing corporate governance frameworks based on legal, economic and social
dimensions. FDI has become a very important international issue mainly due to
the shareholders and other stakeholders now being global rather than local. Thus a
shareholder of an U.S. company residing in Finland may be very concerned with
sharing the profits obtained by using shoddy materials in China. FDI is one of the
main issues facing those who deal with the international political economy and
business studies (Sarkar and Sarkar, 1999). This and other factors that motivate
the need for good corporate governance are pointed to by Subramaniam and
Ratnatunga, 2003:
1. Increase globalisation of financial markets
2. Growth in multinational corporations
3. Regional economic developments
Investors in most countries are accepting the reality that holding an international
equity portfolio leads to higher returns and lower risk compared to a purely domestic
portfolio: but what of governance? Simultaneously, non-finance companies realise
that broadening the investor base will lower their cost of capital and may also
6 Michel Magdi Iskander, Director, PSD, World Bank.
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reduce volatility in stock prices. Further, the pattern of privatization, high equity
issuance and loosening of traditional inter-company ties has led to some remarkable
changes in the equity ownership of some countries. For example, in France, the
combined share of foreign shareholders and financial institutions rose from 27%
in 1993 to 55% in 1997. The importance of corporate governance in banking is
pointed out by Ariff and Hoque, 2007. The institutional investors have forced
companies to adapt their behaviour in order to be able to tap global capital markets
leading to international convergence in corporate governance. Another change is
favouring corporate governance norms is the globalisation of product markets. An
OECD paper in 1999 put it this way:
‘If countries are to reap the full benefits of the global capital market,
and if they are to attract long-term ‘patient’ capital, corporate
governance arrangements must be credible and well understood across
borders. Even if corporations do not rely heavily on foreign sources of
capital, adherence to good corporate governance practices will help
improve the confidence of domestic investors, may reduce the cost of
capital and ultimately induce more stable sources of financing.’ (SEC,
July, 2002).
Approaches to Governance
As we have discussed, corporate governance models differ widely due to differences
in the disciplinary (silo) approach. Another reason for differences is the business
context within which these models develop. The basic contextual factor is
shareholder concentration, which not only includes the percentage holdings of
various stakeholder groups in terms of the ownership of the total number of shares
that are publicly traded, but also includes aspects of concentration in terms of the
power of the CEO, shareholder identity, liquidity of the market and level of mutual
shareholdings (see Appendix 2).
These contextual factors have resulted in the development of different
models of corporate governance around the sphere. Among the developed countries,
the main ones have been seen to be those of the English Speaking Countries,
with discrete controls, and on the other hand German and Japanese models, which
reflect a more concentrated ownership structure. Developing countries like India
have a corporate governance system which is a hybrid of the arms-length market-
based systems of the UK and the U.S. and the insider-dominated-bank-based
systems of Germany and France (Sarkar and Sarkar, 1999). Two corporate
governance models are analysed below – The Anglo-Saxon and The Continental
European models.
In the Anglo-Saxon or market-based system, markets play a decisive role. The
government is at arm’s length relationship with corporations while creating a strong
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competitive environment in which firms operate (anti-trust affirmative actions).
Firms are put under pressure in the product and factor markets, whilst managers
are put under pressure in the managerial labour markets. The belief underlying
this system of corporate governance is that competition and working of the market
system will force companies and managers to act truly in the best interest of
shareholders.7 This model of corporate governance is more prominent in the U.S.
and the U.K.
However, when it comes to the performance measurement, the role and values
of other stakeholders need to be understood. One of the tasks of the board is to
determine the nature of other stakeholders and their importance compared to
shareholders. The second model considered is The Continental European model
which is also known as the stakeholder model. The focus of the Continental model
is on the need to satisfy societal expectations, in particular, the interest of employees
and other stakeholders (suppliers, creditors, tax authorities and the community).
This view dominates in continental Europe (particularly Germany, France and
Netherlands) and in certain countries in Asia.8 (Please refer to the Appendix 2 for
the differences between the above mentioned corporate governance models).9
A HOLISTIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
FRAMEWORK
It can be seen, therefore, that each disciplinary approach has different focus aspects
in terms of control and governance procedures, and that those contextual factors
such as stakeholder concentration plays a part in what control mechanism is chosen
for good governance. A holistic corporate governance framework therefore should
combine these two approaches by considering the contextual factors of socio-
economic environment of a given country.
This approach would indicate that when shareholder concentration is low
(i.e. no one stakeholder group including the CEO controls the company) then good
governance can be achieved legally via the proper preparation of financial
statements and economically via capital market efficiency. If social issues are raised
these would pertain mainly to environmental issues in that all group of stakeholders
7 Carati G., Rad, A.T., (2000), “Convergence of Corporate Governance Systems”, Managerial Finance,
Vol. 26, No. 10, pp. 66-83.
8 Gregory H.J., (2000), “The Globalization of Corporate Governance”, Weil, Gotshal & Manges
LLP, http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/globalisation_of_corporate_governance.pdf, accessed on
26th September, 2003
9 Ooghe, H., Vuyst V.D., “The Anglo-Saxon versus the Continental European Corporate Governance
Model: Empirical Evidence of Board Composition in Belgium”, Vlerick Leuven Gent Management
School, http://www.vlerick.be/research/workingpapers/2001-6.pdf, accessed on 6th September, 2003.
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are ultimately affected by the quality of the societal/global environment. When
there is more stakeholder concentration (medium) then legally, accountability issues
arise where corporate governance procedures are required to ensure that the
organisation has appropriate corporate structures are in place so that those entrusted
with day-to-day management of a company’s affairs are held accountable to
shareholders and other stakeholders. Issues such as internal audits and minority
interests arise in such situations. The economic incentives on the managers are
incentive based, with good performance (high rates of return) appropriately
rewarded by the stakeholders. Some social issues will emerge at this point whereas
there will emerge consensus of opinion amongst some stakeholder groups on issues
such as ethics, environment, child labour etc. (for example these have resulted in
the establishment of ethical investment funds in Australia by Rothschild Australia,
Westpac, Tower, AMP, HESTA, UniSuper and VicSuper).
Where there is high stakeholder concentration, then less reliance can be placed
legally on financial statements and other accountability and audit measures: see
Figure 1. The recent examples of spectacular corporate collapses have been due
mostly to significant concentration of power with the CEO. The failure of the
firms can, at least in part, be attributed to failure of corporate governance designed
to work well within less concentrated contexts, being unable to cope in high
stakeholder concentration environments.
Inappropriate corporate governance mechanisms could lead to corporate failure
represents a waste of scarce resources within an economy. Sporadic and reactionary
attention paid to corporate governance, role and activities of the board of directors
in controlling and monitoring of the management of the firm is insufficient. The
Figure 1 Holistic Corporate Governance Model
HIGH Fiduciary Duties Shareholder Triple-Bottom
of Directors Value Line Accounting
MED Accountability Economic Social Audits
of Managers Incentives to of Managerial
STAKEHOLDER and Internal Managers Actions
CONCENTRATION Audit
LOW Financial Capital Market Environmental
Statement Efficiency Accounting
Controls
LEGAL ECONOMIC  SOCIAL
FOCUS OF CONTROL MECHANISMS
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examples of corporate collapses in the 1990s and later in the exuberant years of
Thatcherite-American-type capitalism illustrates, investors and others are concerned
at how well firms are being managed and whether they are being managed in a
manner that delivers value to the society. Implications from Enron have thus been
noted – need for the board to be active, involved, knowledgeable, and be willing
to take on management and also bear responsibility for performance of the firm
(Fitzroy and Hulbert, 2003). Power concentrated in the hands of two men, Lay and
Skilling, at the top of the firm ensured that fraud could be perpetrated with the
revealed shady advice provided by the accounting-auditing firm, Anderson.
In Australia, the failures in 2001 of the insurance giant HIH, the third largest
Telco namely One-Tel, and of the second largest airline, Ansett, have led to concerns
about the lack of due diligence during takeovers and the inadequacy of protection
of workers and of customers. It has led to workers’ entitlements being put at the
top of the queue of creditors. It is also clear in the context of such collapses that,
though the existence of a market for takeovers has been seen as improving corporate
governance (World Bank, 1999), in practice HIH’s takeover of FAI and Air New
Zealand’s takeover of Ansett, without adequate due diligence, contributed to poor
corporate governance outcomes just a few years after the events. Similar stories
could be told of Parmalat in 2004.
At first glance therefore it appears that when stakeholder concentration is
high, more specific legal controls are required. The essential common points in
the various codes or guides put out around the world deal with such specific controls
may be noted:
– That corporate governance is a means of ensuring that the exercise of
economic power by the corporate sector is grounded in accountability
– whether that is accountability to shareholders or to the broader
community;
– That boards have supervisory and managerial functions;
– That there should be separation between the supervisory and managerial
roles.
Some of the practices suggested in the codes for that purpose include for example:
– Separation of the roles of the Chairman and CEO;
– The appointment of independent directors; and
– The use of board committees, particularly in the areas where the interests
of management and the interests of the company may come into conflict
– e.g. audit, remuneration and nomination.
Most codes also call for comprehensive disclosure to shareholders on all aspects
of corporate governance – a must these days signed by the CEO in the annual
International Journal of Economics and Management
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reports in many Western countries – in particular, on the issues of director and
executive remuneration, independence of directors, and share ownership.
The question in our research is simple. Whether there is any correlation between
performance (creation of value) and corporate governance in terms of the firm’s
ownership and the board. The literature provides us with mixed results with no
consistent findings for any formulation of a definitive theory of ownership and
firm performance. According to analysts at the U.S. investment bank, Morgan
Stanley, share prices falls at just five companies – WorldCom, Tyco, Qwest, Enron
and Computer Associates – have together inflicted a collective $460 billion loss
on stock market capitalisation.
Of the empirical studies, Morck et al. (1988) stands out for the insights it
provides. While it offer some support for a relationship between insider ownership
and firm value, they find that the magnitude of the block holding is a relevant
variable. Their results indicate that firm value increases with insider ownership to
5 per cent, but declines within the band of 5 per cent to 25 per cent. Beyond 25 per
cent, the results are inconclusive. Looked at from the international perspective,
international investor confidence has already been severely dented. At the end of
March 2002, foreign investors owned US$1.75 trillion worth of U.S. equities,
nearly 13 per cent of the outstanding capitalisation of stocks. Now, investors afraid
that the U.S. economic miracle of the previous five years may have been just a
mirage of false accounting, are beginning to bail out of these assets and shift their
capital abroad. An international survey of research on corporate governance and
firm performance by Gugler (2001) also finds mixed results on the relationship
between these two variables. The way researchers approach this issue and the way
regulators approach reform of corporate governance varies between the Anglo-
American model and elsewhere.
According to a report in Far Eastern Economic Review citing Corporate
Accountability (Holland, 2002), U.S. scandals make investors wary, rattle the global
economy and shake up regional currencies. Investors expect good corporate
governance. An earlier 1996 survey by McKinsey reported that investors surveyed
would place an average premium of 11% on stocks of well-governed companies.
The reciprocal, of course, is that investors will punish individual companies, or
broader markets, or even whole national capital markets, for serious governance
deficiencies (recall the marked down values of Japan and ASEAN economies in
the late 1997-9). In the new century, these cautionary studies cannot be dismissed
as academic over-cry. We are living through this reality in the most sophisticated
and developed economies the world have ever seen (SEC, July, 2002). In Wall
Street parlance, smart investors discount for fraud, meaning they now assume
dishonesty in corporate auditing and have priced it in when they calculate a stock’s
value. Others have fled the market entirely.
The Jensen and Meckling’s (1986) agency model of the firm has as a central
theme the alignment of the interests of directors and owners through the acquisition
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of substantial holdings by directors. Corporate governance has been linked to the
ambition to ensure, through adequate investment in the corporate sector, a long-
term economic growth and, if possible, social welfare. From this perspective, it
becomes evident that the importance of good corporate governance extends far
beyond the interest of shareholders in any individual company. When stakeholder
concentration is high, triple-bottom bottom line accounting is required in the social
context, where companies are recognised as existing to create wealth or long-term
value on an economically, socially and environmentally sustainable basis, i.e.
‘sustainable value creation’.
DO ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE SERVE
GOVERNANCE?
Corporate governance mechanisms are required to ultimately prevent corporate
failure. Do accounting and finance tools assist in improving corporate performance?
We explore this second issue of this paper in this section. The research design to
answer this important question begins with the identification of a number of grand
failed firms, and then investigate if the information and analytical framework
developed in the two disciplines could have predicted the failures ahead of time. If
the concepts do not help in this regard, then the role of accounting and finance is
diminished for governance issues. Since the 1920s there has been an interest on
the part of a number of researchers to try to identify those ratios or groups of ratios
at firm levels, which predict failures within a class of firms, relative to each other.
If this prediction can be made early enough, then corrective actions could be
undertaken by the various stakeholder groups.
Discriminant Analysis
In 1968, Edward Altman published full details of a model he developed using a
statistical technique referred to as discriminant analysis. More than 50 research
studies have been published, each one using a similar approach, sometimes with a
slight modification, for example, to the way the companies were chosen or the
way the ratios were chosen. The measure he developed is widely accepted today
as a good guide for estimating ahead of time the likelihood of failures.
During the last two decades there have been numerous examples of the misuses
of company failure prediction models. The main problems seem to be concerned
with the strict mathematical requirements of discriminant analysis, as the
methodology produces a model which is neither kind nor forgiving. However, we
are not after the Holy Grail that has proved to be elusive - i.e. a model to consistently
single out companies that will fail from those that might fail. Instead we are after
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an indicator that will raise alarm bells so that stricter governance procedures can
be implemented once early warning signs are known. Our goal is more like that of
a fire department that responds to all phone calls of a fire, false or not.
In financial studies, discriminant analysis is applied to two groups of financial
ratios. One group derived from the last set of accounts of companies prior to failure,
and the other from the accounts of on-going companies. The statistical procedure
is then designed to produce a single score (Z score) which can be used to classify
a company as belonging to the failed group or the on-going group (see Robertson
and Mills, 1991).
During the development of Altman’s 1968 model, 33 companies were selected
for the failed group. The criteria for selection required each company to be in
manufacturing. The asset size ranged from $0.7 m to $25.9 m. The dates of the last
set of accounts ranged from 1946 to 1965. The on-going group was selected using
a paired sample, each failed company being paired with an on-going company
both in terms of industry and size. From an initial list of 22 financial ratios, the
final model consisted of five ratios that, when combined in a specific manner, was
able to discriminate between the bankrupt and the non-bankrupt companies in his
study. Later, he created what he calls the four-variable version (see Table 1). This
version is appropriate for both public and private firms, and for both manufacturers
and service companies.
Table 1 Determining the Cut-off for Altman’s 4-Variable Model
The Z Score Bankruptcy Classification Model
Ratio Mean Ratio Values
Names Description Coefficient Altman’s Sample Cos.
Bankrupt Non-bankrupt
X1=
Working Capital
6.56 (0.061) 0.414
Total Assets
X2 =
Retained Earnings
3.26 (0.626) 0.355
Total Assets
X3 =
EBIT
6.72 (0.318) 0.154
Total Assets
X4 =
Net Worth 1.05 0.494 2.684
Total Liabilities
Cut off Values Mean Scores
Safe if greater than: Z 2.60 Non-bankrupt  7.70
Bankrupt if less than: Z 1.10 Bankrupt (4.06)
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The variables together with their respective weights are shown as follows:
Z-Score = 6.56 (XI) + 3.26 (X2) + 6.72 (X3) + 1.05 (X4) (1)
When calculating a company’s Z Score one needs to simply take the figures
for the four ratios, which Altman calls XI, X2, X3 and X4 from its financial
statements and then, multiply their values by the coefficients Altman has derived
in his formula (for U.S. firms). Finally, one adds up the results and compares
against the cut-off scores, where Z is the sum of the ratios times the weights and
the individual ratios are defined as:
X1 = Working capital/Total assets (2)
X2 = Retained earnings/Total assets (3)
X3 = Profit before interest and tax/Total assets (4)
X4 = Net Worth/ Total Liabilities (5)
To make the model operational, the failed group and the on-going group are
combined and then ordered according to their individual Z scores. It is then possible
to specify two limits as follows:
– An upper limit, where no failed companies are misclassified and,
– a lower limit, where no on-going companies are misclassified.
The area between the upper (2.60) and lower (1.10) limit is what Altman
describes as the ‘zone of ignorance’ or the ‘grey area’, where a number of failed
companies and/or on-going companies could be misclassified. The mean values
of the ratios of Altman’s sample companies in the bankrupt and non-bankrupt
categories are also provided in our Table 4 later.
Of the many problems cited in using the Altman Model, one in particular
must be further explored. That is, it is not valid to use the model to observe trends.
It has been argued by Robertson and Mills (1991) that corporate prediction models
are developed to operate on a single year’s data. This means that the latest year’s
data is used to predict the possibility of failure in the next year. Barnes (1984, p.
13) is particularly critical of the idea of observing Z score trends when he states
that “It involves using discriminant coefficients for one period for financial ratios
and Z scores for another.”.
However, Altman (1970) gives an example of using trends over a five-year
period, and concludes that the degree of seriousness is measured by the yearly
change in the values. Let us be quite clear, the degree of seriousness in a discriminant
analysis model is measured by a comparison against a specific cut-off, not by
comparing the yearly change in ratio values. Two further examples of the use of
trends can be found, the first in Inman (1982, p. 38) where he states “… we can
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monitor the rate of change by examining earlier figures”, and the second in
Robertson (1984) where he suggests that observing trends in Altman’s Z scores
provides additional useful information. Finally, Moyer (1977) attempted to
overcome the need for trends when he re-estimated Altman’s 1968 model to develop
separate models, one year, two years and three years prior to failure. We believe
that as we are using Alman’s Z-Score as an indicator, analysing its trend would
prove useful.
Altman’s 1968 model has been used in the decision-making process to aid
troubled company to turnaround. A report by Altman and Lafleur (1981) describes
how the underlying actions taken at GTI were designed to increase the overall Z
score. In a response to a book review, which contained a chapter on Altman and
Lafleur, Altman (1984) suggests that ‘it takes an extremely insightful manager to
utilise a passive model and make it active in such a way as to stimulate his future
decisions in order to assess various business strategies.’ Hence, this model has
wide acknowledgment.
Let us now assess if the Altman model could have been used as an indicator in
the spectacular collapses that have heralded the new interest in corporate
governance, in terms of the dramatic collapses have brought about much debate
on issues of overly creative (and often fraudulent) accounting and poor corporate
governance.
Is the Altman Z-Score (which remember was developed based on U.S. data
from 1920-1960) still applicable in the U.S. (for Enron, WorldCom), and also in a
country that was independent of the data, by analysing the major collapses in
Australia during that period (Ansett Airlines, OneTel). Table 2 shows that Ansett
Table 2 The Z-Score in the Year Before Crisis Year
(Computed based on data over 5 years in each case)
Year of Ratio X1 X2 X3 X4
Crisis Weight 6.56 3.26 6.72 1.05
2002 Ansett –0.071 –0.003 0.063 0.233
 Z-Score 0.188 (Bankrupt): Below safe score
2000 Enron 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.21
 Z-Score 0.86 (Bankrupt): Below safe score
2000 One.Tel 0.18 –0.197 –0.18 1.92
 Z-Score 1.32 (Grey area): Below safe score
2001 WorldCom –0.00005 0.042 0.038 1.26
 Z-Score 1.71 (Grey area): Below safe score
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and Enron were classified as bankrupt and OneTel and WorldCom as being in the
grey area.
Z-Scores could have been used to justify more stringent corporate governance
procedures in attempts to avert collapse of the companies.
Valuation Model and Ratio Analysis
In the next two tables two different statistical approaches are used to address the
same issue. The theoretical value of each of these firms is estimated using two
different approaches: the Net Tangible Asset Model widely used by market analysts
and the Free Cash Flow approach using a version widely used by academics (and
increasingly by the industry specialists) based on Damodaran (2002). The free
cash flow model estimates an intrinsic value of the shares of a firm:
1
0
E
FCFEV
K g
=
−
(6)
Where,        V0 : the theoretical value expected of a share unit given,
FCFE1 : free cash flows, which are economic profits of firm after all
outlays,
      KE : the required rate of return as per capital market theory, and
         g : the growth rate in the economic profits of the firm.
The free cash flow to equity holders (FCFE) is computed from modelling the
firm’s earnings, then adjusting these earnings for current activities and long-term
investment and financing activities.10 These numbers derived from this finance
model are then compared with the actual share prices in the year before the collapse
of these four firms. In the lower portion of the Table 3, the reader will find the ratio
of the intrinsic values to the market price.
For example, in the year before the failure of OneTel, the financial model
using free cash flows approach revealed that the market price of A$0.47 is seven
times higher than the intrinsic value of A$0.071. In the case of Enron, the intrinsic
value is a third of the market value. Had an analyst applied the free cash flow
model, she would have identified that the firm’s share price is awfully overvalued
by the market. The comparative statistics of free cash flow to the market price
revealed that Enron’s intrinsic value was just 31.3 per cent of the market price, a
foreboding tell-tale of the trouble to come in the following year. The more popular
10 See Damodaran (2002) for a clearer exposition of this model. It has been established by researchers
that valuation using this model has produced more accurate expected pricing of shares than any
previous models.
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Net Tangible Asset model is unable to provide an alarm bell about the insufficiency
of the assets to meet the high value placed by the market.
These statistics would appear to suggest that there is yet another method of
raising alarm bells by applying the more reliable free cash flow model that have
now become popular since 1998 to judge if the share prices driven by the euphoria
are indeed a case of overpricing.
In Table 4 are further statistics that examine some critical accounting ratios
normally available to any analyst. The critical ratios of the four failed companies
are compared with the critical ratios of (a) bankrupt and (b) non-bankrupt firms.
For example, the ‘Quick Assets/Current Liabilities’ of bankrupt firm is 0.838 (i.e.
83.8% of liabilities): Except in the case of the OneTel, this ratio of each of the
other failed companies is smaller than this critical value suggesting that this ratio
could set an alarm bell about the liquidity of Ansett, Enron and WorldCom in the
year before the failures of these companies. Similar evidence is seen from the
statistics on ‘MVE/(MVE+Debt)’.
This ratio is far lower than the critical value of 0.999 (almost 1.00), which
suggests that the market value is far short of the value expected to support the
shareholders and bondholders. The next ratio ‘Total Debt/Total Assets’ corroborates
this as well suggesting that these later-to-fail-firms had too much debt relative to
the non-failing firms. The application of above critical ratios on a selective basis
could have forewarned an analyst of the dangers inherent as revealed in the financial
statements even though there were creative accounting distorting mainly the
‘earnings’ of these potential failures in the year ahead. In short, our analyses using
(a) Z-scores, (b) recently-available Finance valuation models and (c) critical ratio
models indicate that it would have been possible to predict the potential failures or
at least raise alarm bells in the year ahead simply using the available techniques.
Table 3 Comparisons of Market Price with Other Model Prices
(Computed using data over five years before crisis)
 Ansett Enron OneTel WorldCom
Year of Crisis 2002 2000 2000 2001
     
Market price Unlisted $65.97 A$ 0.470 $15.03
Free Cash flow A$ 7.49 $20.65 A$ 0.071 $3.83
Net Tangible asset A$ 42.30 84.93 0.4284 $18.19
                    Comparative Ratios
FCF price/market price No 0.313 0.149 0.26
NTA/market price No 1.29 0.92 1.21
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Table 4 Financial Ratio Analysis of Failed Companies
(Using data over five years prior to crisis year)
Financial ratios Ansett Enron OneTel Worldcom   Mean of Distribution
     Bankrupt Non-
bankrupt
 Rate of Return measures
Cash Flow/
Net Worth
0.713 0.1198 0.355 0.024 0.119 0.316
Net Income/
Net Worth
–0.019 0.0781 –0.308 0.023 –0.591 0.091
Quick Assets/
Total assets
0.271 0.2454 0.385 0.278 0.258 0.273
 Liquidity Positions
Current Assets/
Current Liabilities
0.775 1.0695 1.670 0.999 1.860 2.381
Quick Assets/
Current Liabilities
0.705 0.566 1.470 0.730 0.838 1.231
 Financial Leverage
MVE/
(MVE + Book Debt)
na 0.5678 0.663 0.501 0.995 0.999
Total Debt/
Total Assets
0.811 0.56 0.342 0.422 0.785 0.476
 Activity
Accounts
Receivables/Sales
0.143 0.10315 0.334 0.150 0.188 0.147
Sales/Total Assets 0.952 0.6499 0.455 0.339 0.836 0.783
SD of Net Income
to net worth
0.245 3.347 0.266 0.030 3.330 0.179
Total Assets 3,689 65,503 1,435 103914 153.76 769.05
 Stock Return and Volatility
Common Stock
Return
na –1.614 –0.302 0.0043 –0.045 0.003
Variance of Stock
Return
na 0.0101 0.0027 0.0207 0.011 0.004
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CONCLUSION
Though the topic ‘Corporate Governance’ gained worldwide prominence, as yet it
is variously-defined, and consequently blurred at the edges. It is evident undoubtedly
that corporate governance is relevant as a subject, as an objective, or as a regime to
be followed for the good of shareholders, employees, customers, bankers and indeed
for the reputation and standing of a nation and its economy (Maw et al., 1994).
Whatever corporate governance arrangement a public company chooses, they have
to rest on a sound platform. They have to be well understood and accepted by
those who provide the firm with key resources, namely, capital. Anything less will
not only hurt the firm, it will also hurt the entire capital market and eventually the
economy’s prospects for prosperity.
It can be argued from the above discussion that every company operates under
its own specific conditions though, and in order to operate efficiently, firms need
to adapt their governance system to these circumstances as it has become very
challenging for organisations to create value and gain shareholders’ confidence
for broadening the investment base both in domestic and international markets in
a turbulent world, ex post the collapses of big corporate bodies, Enron, WorldCom,
OneTel, Ansett, HIH, Parmalat and so on. It is also evident that globalisation may
have initiated the adoption of a few common corporate governance standards across
regimes but there is little evidence to show that these standards have or will be
implemented widely. As the Chairman of SEC: (Australian Securities & Investments
Commission, July 2002, p. 12) mentioned:
“It is a time for serious commitment to enhancing and embracing
international accounting standards; for sensibly redressing conflicts
of interest which have beset corporate managers, auditors, analysts
and other intermediaries and professional service providers; for
examining ways to motivate and empower shareholders – including
institutions and fund managers – to accept greater responsibility for
enforcing corporate accountability; and for examining methodologies
by which Boards might better secure high governance standards.”
Therefore the design and development of corporate governance systems should
aim at protecting the vulnerable from exploitation by those who manage and control
corporation while making it punitive for the professionals managing the accounts
from falsifying the books. Though the evidence of a strong positive link between
governance and firm performance is limited, there does seem to be a link between
active boards and performance (Fitzroy, 2003). However, corporate governance –
viewed not as merely a legal ritual to manage directors’ liabilities, but as a living
economic dynamic, integrated into the business – can help build a solid foundation
to create wealth and protect shareholder interests. Corporations should strive to
achieve a culture of governance and resist the temptation to give formal, rather
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than substantive compliance to the principles of good governance (ASEC, July
2002). Professionals monitoring and certifying a firm to be a safe entity should
engage the more recently developed models that use information to warn of
impending failures just as much as the society’s role in safeguarding the
stakeholders’ welfare must be enhanced by letting the larger society have a say in
this issue beyond the corporations.
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APPENDIX I: AVERAGE PREMIUM INVESTORS ARE
WILLING TO PAY FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE11
(Selected Countries only)
Country Premium %
Venezuela 28
Indonesia 27
Thailand 26
Malaysia 25
Italy 22
Japan 20
Germany 20
United States 18
APPENDIX  II: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ANGLO
AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN MODELS:
Shareholder concentration
A first difference between the two models is that Anglo-American countries have
a low concentration of shareholders, whereas in Continental Europe shareholder
groups hold large percentages of the total number of shares that are publicly traded.
Further, Anglo-American countries have a large number of listed companies,
whereas in Continental European countries only a small proportion of the total
numbers of firms are listed. For example, in the UK, which follows the Anglo-
American model, institutional investors’ share of stock market investment rose
from 19% in 1963 to 59% thirty years later.12
Shareholder identity
A second difference between the two corporate governance models is the identity
of the shareholders. In the United States and the United Kingdom most of the
shares are in the hands of the agents of financial institutions (more than 50%)
rather than private persons (20-30%). This is in sharp contrast with the pattern in
Germany, France, and Italy where private companies (20-40%), financial
11 Source: Coombes, P. and M. Watson (2000), Three surveys on corporate governance, McKinsey
Quarterly, 4.
12 “Converging cultures: trends in European Corporate Governance”, 1997, www.pwcglobal.com/
uk/eng/ins-sol/survey-rep/surv-converging.html, accessed on 26th September, 2002.
Research in an Emerging Malaysian Capital Market: A Guide to Future Direction
23
institutions themselves (10-30%), and private persons (15-35%) hold most of the
shares. For example in Italy, the five largest shareholders in listed companies
typically hold nearly 90% of the shares, compared to 21% in Britain.13
Liquidity of the market
A third difference between the Anglo-American and the Continental European
business context is the number of listed companies as a percentage of the total
number of companies in a country. In the United States and the United Kingdom,
many companies are listed and their shares are publicly traded. This means that
many companies have little personal contact with their shareholders. In Continental
European countries, on the other hand, fewer companies are publicly traded.
Because more companies are private, a strong (personal) relationship exists between
the management of the company and its shareholders. In many cases, these two
functions are not separated.
Mutual shareholdings
Due to the number of mutual shareholdings and the limited extent of information
disclosure, the ownership structure in Continental European countries is not as
transparent as in Anglo-American countries. Regulations such as anti-trust laws
and the “arm’s length rule” between parent and daughter companies have further
limited the complexity of the ownership structure in Anglo-American countries as
compared to Continental countries.
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